Negotiating with Evil - Book Review

Should we negotiate with terrorists?

In Mitchel B. Reiss' book, Negotiating with Evil: When to Talk to Terrorists, the argument is made that choosing to negotiate with terrorists is a decision that is dependent on the situation, and negotiations can either be a success or make the situation worse. Reiss explains that "While there is no guarantee that talking to enemy states will promote a country's national interests, there is likewise no guarantee that not talking will do so" (10).

Reiss further explains that before negotiating, states must know whether the terrorist is capable of evolving and abandoning its violence. If not, it makes no sense to invest in an entity that is unwilling to change its narrow-minded world paradigm. States must also know if the leadership of the terrorist organization has the authority to make binding deals. If not, no accountability will exist. The negotiations usually need to be done in secret, and governments need to have the capacity to walk away. If the negotiations were made public, other actors could get unnecessarily involved and create more conflict rather than achieve the goal of peace. Governments need to be seen as if they are in control and thus need to be able to walk away when the negotiations don't benefit the state. Attempting to negotiate, however, is worth it because missing the chance to end a conflict can be consequential. More harm can come to denying that chance to understand the structure, rivalries, and the ways members of terrorist groups may be recruited and turned to other states' advantages.

As a scholar of international security, Reiss uses his experience as a former diplomat and American ambassador that led the American participation in Northern Ireland peace talks and helped negotiate the nuclear crisis in North Korea to provide context for the reader. He uses his own personal encounters when negotiating for the US and additionally looks back to history. For example, he cited the encounter between Western governments and terrorist group, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), where successful negotiations took decades. This was due to the Western states having needed to continue in their efforts to degrade the Irish Republican Army and look for leaders to step into the organization to guide it to become a more traditional political movement rather than a terrorist organization. He cites five case studies: the British and the IRA, Spain and the Basque terrorist group ETA, Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers, the United States and Iraqi Sunni tribes, and finally Israel and Hamas. He also used United States officials to provide context to his thesis, having once citing CIA Director George Tenet on "stateless zones", or areas that that are not controlled by governments. These areas tend to be havens for criminal and terrorist activities. This provides context for his prediction that because these havens have continuously been forming, they will continue to do so in the future. Thus, terrorist activity will increase, and governments will need a way to gain control in those areas in the near future. Negotiations can be an avenue through which governments take the step in gaining a better presence in those areas. Finally, Mitchell Reiss uses his experiences and research gathered while writing the book. He spent three years traveling the world and found that most governments have already negotiated with terrorist groups, and that these negotiations have been happening at a more frequent level than anyone would have expected, granted most have been done in secret.

When taking a step away from the reading and pursuing uncovered facts and opinions of others, most will argue something similar - negotiating should be used in counterterrorism strategy. 

Clint Watts, a fellow for the Foreign Policy Research Institute, recognizes that while 

no one wants to give terrorists even a shred of legitimacy through negotiations, [...] even hardline counterterrorist countries like Israel have at times recognizes the need to cut a deal with their enemies.

In fact, former President Obama began to communicate and negotiate with terrorists in hostage situations, which came with repercussions from some of the American population that had followed the rhetoric of "We will never negotiate with terrorists!" that has been said over the decade. In retrospective, the United States was, in fact, pursuing a situation where there would be less boots on the ground and a "lighter footprint globally via an increasing reliance on regional and local partners" ("Should the United States Negotiate with Terrorists?"). 

Negotiating led to the United States being less likely to partake in a war against these organizations. The European Institute of Peace (EIP) brings another perspective into this discussion, making it a point that the phrase "war on terror" is an oxymoron because "tactics cannot be defeated, even if those who make use of them can be" ("Negotiating with Terrorists?"). 

Thus, the conclusion is made that negotiating isn't necessarily ceding to the enemy, but instead acknowledges the enemy's existence and a will to end conflict regardless of ideology and tactics. However, it is also made clear by the EIP makes it explicitly clear that while negotiating is a valid strategy, it should be complementary, and not treated as the sole approach. This provides a position similar to the book, Negotiating with Evil, and expanding on the argument made in including negotiation into counterterrorism strategies, but not having it become the single stratagem. 

In addition to what was stated before, Karl Roberts, a Professor and Chair of Policing and Criminal Justice, acknowledges that "negotiation has been described as one of the most effective developments in law enforcement" and has, in fact, been successful when negotiating with terrorists. 

Granted, no strategy will be perfect, and the risk of casualties will always exist and be real. However, it was concluded by Professor Roberts that "attempts to negotiate with terrorists [...] appear to be worthwhile" ("Should we Negotiate with Terrorist Hostage Takers?"). Negotiations have helped release hostages in the past during a terrorist situation - after all, terrorists have many vulnerabilities, needs, and interests of non-terrorist hostage takers. This provides a position similar to the book in heavily supporting it with specific examples in the past, as well as a couple of points rebutting the common arguments against negotiating with terrorists. It also recognizes how negotiations have been frequently used in the past, albeit secretive.

On the other spectrum of the argument, it can be argued that negotiating with terrorists will only lead to error in strategies and plan, leading to chaos and calamity. 

Darell Puls, a professional negotiator of 26 years, explains that this is due to the distinction between the Western worldview and the radical Islamist worldview. The west "assumes that all worldviews have legitimacy. [...] This [...] does not comport with the reality of radical Islam where the madrasas teach the students not how to live for the fundamental betterment of the human race, but how to die while killing as many 'infidels' [...] as possible" ("Should we Negotiate with Terrorists - A Counterpoint"). He continues to argue that negotiating with terrorists isn't fruitful because one simply can't talk while simultaneously being attacked upon, and there comes a time when you need to attack back. 

Negotiations are futile, such as when it took two years for the US and Vietnam to reach an agreement. It was only during massive bomb raids when true negotiating occurred. This provides a position not taken by the book and providing examples throughout history to support the position that negotiating as a counter-terrorism strategy is futile. Others recognize that negotiating with terrorists gives criminals a chance to also be seen as rebels with a cause who need to be accommodated ("When Negotiating with Terrorists Works"). 

However, this doesn't take into account the possibilities behind negotiating that is taken into account with Negotiating with Terrorism, such as the successful instances that decreased the possibility of further war, conflict, and boots on the ground. Additionally, it doesn't consider what Jonathon Powell, the author of Talking to Terrorists, mentions - that being the fact that when "governments usually delay talking to armed groups for too long, [...] a large number of people die unnecessarily" ("Chatham House Forum: Should Governments Negotiate with Terrorists?"). He takes an absolute position for negotiating with terrorists, believing that governments should both be ready to negotiate with terrorists and open a communication platform with terrorists at the earlier stages of a conflict. He compares not only the reasons why negotiating with terrorists would be helpful, but also compares suggestions as to what governments need to do when faced with the situation. He supports the argument made by Negotiating with Evil and provides further analysis. 

Thus, the argument made by most is that because negotiations aren't fool-proof strategies, it can't be treated as a diagnosis that will cure the cancer of terrorism. However, it can be used as a complementary tactic to make the war against terror more efficient for those fighting the terrorists.

In all, the book was enjoyable - it was engaging and informative. It contributed to my understanding as to why some may be opposed to negotiating with terrorists, and the reasons that governments have in gaining the skill to negotiate with evil. It brought a unique viewpoint to the Classic Realism and Liberalism theories. In regard to Classic Realism, power is the driving force of the system, and states are rational actors. Negotiating relies on the idea that those participating have the will to be rational. It also relies on a power play - each actor is attempting to gain the most control. In stateless zones, there is usually a bipolar or multipolar balance of power, where alliances between states and terrorist organizations may exist. 

For example, when Mitchell Reiss negotiated with the Irish Republican Army (IRA), he negotiated with three senior officials of Sinn Fein, a political party closely associated with the IRA. Coincidentally, those three officials were also senior members of the IRA. These close alliances and associations can be seen as these terrorist groups attempting to gain more power. 

This also provides more of an explanation of Liberalism because negotiating doesn't involve military unless used as a threat. It is the belief that negotiating can be a positive sum game - where the state can gain peace and stability.

It also promotes the idea of globalization - where states can be impacted by terrorist organizations located across the world - whether it be through direct attacks or attacks on allies. Liberalism and the idea of interconnectedness are important when discussing negotiations - after all, there is no reason to negotiate with terrorist groups that don't pose a direct threat to a state. 

However, that state could still choose to negotiate on behalf of its allies. For example, the US has stopped funding the Palestinian Liberation Organization in support of its ally, Israel. However, the PLO has not affected or violated the US in any way. The interconnectedness of the world plays a large role in negotiations, and whom those negotiations are done for. What I've learned from this book is that negotiations are based on the idea of "at least I tried it" in order to avoid the idea of losing the possibility for peace and the possibility for the end of terrorism from a specific group. Negotiations should be a counterterrorism tool, not necessarily the only tool, but it should be used to the state's advantage.

Works Cited

• Miles, Kathleen. "When Negotiating With Terrorists Works." The Huffington Post, TheHuffingtonPost.com, 2 Oct. 2016, www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/weekend-roundup-137_us_57ebe81ce4b024a52d2be5d9.
  
• Powell, Jonathon. "Chatham House Forum: Should Governments Negotiate With Terrorists?" Chatham House, Chatham House, 6 Dec. 2017, www.chathamhouse.org/event/chatham-house-forum-should-governments-negotiate-terrorists.
  
• Puls, Darell. "Should We Negotiate With Terrorists - A Counterpoint." Mediate.com - Find Mediators - World's Leading Mediation Information Site, www.mediate.com/articles/puls.cfm.
  
• Reiss, Mitchell B. 2010. Negotiating with Evil: When to Talk to Terrorists. New York, NY: Open Road Media
  
• Roberts, Karl. "Should We Negotiate with Terrorist Hostage Takers?" The Conversation, The Conversation, 26 Nov. 2018, theconversation.com/should-we-negotiate-with-terrorist-hostage-takers-78390.
  
• Tyner, Evan. "Negotiating with Terrorists?" European Institute of Peace, eip.org/en/news-events/negotiating-terrorists.
• Watts, Clint. "Should the United States Negotiate with Terrorists?" Lawfare, 18 Aug. 2015, www.lawfareblog.com/should-united-states-negotiate-terrorists.